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In America, we have come to expect our presidential elections to occur
without much disruption or controversy. Those expectations occasionally
conflict with the realities of modem election methods and technologies. This
conflict was most evident in the presidential election of 2000, while the
country waited more than a month to learn whether Vice President Al Gore
or Texas Governor George W. Bush would become our next president. The
controversial decision by the Supreme Court finally put an end to the elec-
tion, but it certainly did not end the debate.
Following the 2000 election, significant federal and state government
reforms have begun and even more are pending. One fundamental question
remains: Have we corrected the problems that created the havoc in late
2000, or have we only set ourselves up for future maelstroms? I contend that
if we do not institute a system by which a voter's ballot can be verified after
the election day, we are only preparing for a repeat of the crisis faced by the
United States Supreme Court in Bush v. Gore.'
* Paul Charton is an attorney at Catlett & Stodola, PLC, in Little Rock, Arkansas,
practicing immigration law. Mr. Charton previously worked in Washington, D.C., as a legis-
lative assistant to United States Congressman Marion Berry and as the Manager of Political
Affairs for the National Cattlemen's Beef Association. The author thanks those who provided
their insight on the thesis and content of this essay: S. Graham Catlett; H. Bradley Walker;
Penelope Sur; Michael Mosley; Christian Harris; and Erin Buford Vinett. The author also
thanks the staff of Congressman Vic Snyder, particularly Leo Monterrey and Katie Hargis,
who provided access to very useful reports from the Congressional Research Service and
Government Accountability Office.
1. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). Although many scholars have analyzed the case of Bush v. Gore
in extraordinary detail, this essay will not focus on the much-debated merits and shortcom-
ings of that case. In order to provide context, this essay will give only a minimal explanation
of Bush v. Gore. Instead, the essay will focus on a particular practical aspect of our current
vote counting systems. For readers who seek additional information on the academic treat-
ment of Bush v. Gore, there is a wealth of information available. See, e.g., BUSH v. GoRE: THE
QUESTION OF LEGITIMACY (Bruce Ackerman ed., Yale Univ. Press 2002); RICHARD A.
POSNER, BREAKING THE DEADLOCK: THE 2000 ELECTION, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE
COURTS, (Princeton Univ. Press 2001). Erwin Chemerinsky, How Should We Think About
Bush v. Gore, 34 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1 (Fall 2002); Nelson Lund, The Unbearable Rightness of
Bush v. Gore, 23 CARDOZO L. REv. 1219 (2002); and Laurence H. Tribe, Erog v. Hsub And
Its Disguises: Freeing Bush v. Gore from Its Hall of Mirrors, 115 HARv. L. REV. 170 (2001).
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II. BACKGROUND ON THE 2000 ELECTION
On November 7, 2000,2 Americans justifiably believed they would
learn who was to be their first new president of the millennium-normally
the results of the election are announced soon after the last polls close. In-
stead, the 2000 election day began a roller coaster ride that led to chaos3 and
numerous court battles.4 The next few weeks did not yield much comfort or
resolution. Eventually, the country learned that Gore received over a half-
million more popular votes than Bush received,5 but surprisingly this would
not determine the outcome of the presidential election. America awoke on
November 8 to learn that the election hinged on whether Gore or Bush had
won Florida's pivotal electoral votes. 6 The tabulation from the electronic
vote-counters showed Bush's lead in the State at a mere 1,784 votes 7 -a
margin small enough to trigger an automatic recount.8 After the legally
mandated recount revealed that Bush's lead in Florida had diminished, 9 the
fight moved from being exclusively political to an uncomfortable mixture of
politics, spin, and legal challenges.1"
2. See 3 U.S.C. § 1 (1997) (setting the Tuesday after the first Monday of November in
every fourth year as the date on which presidential elections shall be held).
3. See David Von Drehle et al., A Wild Ride Into Uncharted Territory; Two Candidates
Caught a Whiff of Defeat-and Then Rapidly Mobilized for a Recount War, WASH. POST, Jan.
28, 2001, at Al (describing a presidential election between Vice President Al Gore and Texas
Governor George W. Bush that was so tight that the decision would rest on who claimed
Florida's electoral votes. During election evening, American television networks first proc-
laimed Gore the winner of Florida, then retracted the proclamation, then declared Bush the
winner of Florida and hence the presidency, and then declared both Florida and the presiden-
cy too close to call.).
4. See id. "The election dispute in Florida went on for 36 days-a whirlwind of more
than 50 lawsuits, and appeals to every possible court, news conferences, protests, speeches,
public hearings, private strategies and televised ballot-counting sessions." Id.
5. National Archives and Records Administration, 2000 Presidential Election: Popular
Vote Totals, http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/electoralcollege/2000/popular-
vote.html (last visited July 31, 2007) (noting the result as Gore 50,996,582 to Bush
50,456,062).
6. See Drehle, supra note 3.
7. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. ("Bush F'), 531 U.S. 70, 73 (2000) (per
curiam).
8. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.141(4) (West 1999).
9. Bush 1, 531 U.S. at 73.
10. See Dan Balz et al., "hat If?; The Election's Over, But Many Questions Remain
about the Battle for Florida, WASH. POST NAT'L WEEKLY ED., Feb. 12-18, 2001, at 7. In
describing the Gore choice of seeking recounts only in certain Florida counties, the POST
stated:
In practical terms, he had no alternative. There was no simple mechanism to trigger
a statewide recount. State law required requests in 67 counties, with county can-
vassing boards given the power to determine whether to grant or reject a recount.
Politically, Gore's team believed that such a move, which would have to come
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Despite the increasingly narrowing margin from the ongoing vote re-
counts, on November 26, Florida Secretary of State Katherine Harris certi-
fied that George W. Bush had won the State: 2,912,790 to 2,912,253-a
537-vote victory." Marking a first in American history, Gore filed a formal
contest of the presidential election results in three Florida counties the day
after the certification.1 2 Meanwhile, one of the court cases led to a Florida
Supreme Court decision that required the hand counting of all of Florida's
presidential votes.' 3 Many will remember the pandemonium that ensued as
ballot counters scrutinized paper "punch card" ballots to divine the supposed
intent of a far-removed voter.
Voters could only sit and wait to learn the outcome of the swirling le-
gal battles in Florida and Washington. There was a deadline, however. Fed-
eral statutory law gives presumptive protection to electors who were chosen
using the laws in place six days prior to the meeting of the electors from
around the nation. 4 Gore's attorneys conceded that Florida's votes needed
to be counted before December 12, 2000."5 Counting the votes by December
12 would allow the state's slate of electors to cast their votes unchallenged.
Eventually, as we all now know, the United States Supreme Court effective-
within 72 hours after the election, would have been a public relations disaster, in-
terpreted by opponents and even neutral observers as an effort to prolong the elec-
tion unnecessarily. Id.
11. U.S. News Online, Election 2000: Timeline of Postelection Events
http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/election/magtimeline.htm (last visited July 31, 2007).
During the maniacal maneuvering that accompanied this battle, some counties began loosen-
ing their counting standards to include dents and marks that appeared on the ballots, while at
the same time Miami-Dade's board concluded that the task was too daunting and halted its
counting altogether. See id.
12. See id.
13. See Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1262 (2000). In the majority opinion, the court
cites Florida Statute section 102.168(8) which gives the circuit judge authority to "fashion
such orders as he or she deems necessary to ... provide any relief appropriate under such
circumstances." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.168(8) (2000). The opinion also cites the statutory
provision purporting to guide the counting of returns. See Id. § 101.5614 (2000) (noting that
any ballot which is damaged or defective so that it can not be machine-read "shall be counted
manually at the counting center by the canvassing board;" and stating, "[N]o vote shall be
declared invalid or void if there is a clear indication of the intent of the voter as determined
by the canvassing board.").
14. See 3 U.S.C. § 5 (2000) (describing the so-called "safe harbor" for states' electors).
15. See Drehle, supra note 2. In an exchange between Florida Supreme Court Chief
Justice Wells and Gore lawyer David Boies during oral arguments in which the Chief Justice
was pressing on this matter, Mr. Boies replied, "as long as the manual recounts will not im-
pair the final certification in time to permit the selection of electors by December 12, those
manual recounts must be included." Id. "[Boies] referred directly five times, and indirectly
several more, to the Dec. 12 deadline. Underlying all his answers-and many of the questions
from the bench - was an unspoken assumption that the count was sure to give the lead to
Gore. Then the ticking clock would be Bush's problem." Id. (citations omitted).
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ly stopped the vote counting in Florida. 6 Because the Florida Secretary of
State had certified Bush as the winner, halting the vote count meant that the
state's decisive electors would go to George W. Bush, thereby allowing him
to become the next United States President.
III. BUSH V. GORE
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that Americans
have a fundamental right to vote that is protected under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Constitution. 7 In its landmark decisions of Gray v. Sanders8
and Reynolds v. Sims, 19 the Court explained that the Constitution undeniably
protects the right to vote20 and that equal protection demands that each per-
son must have one vote. 2' It was this idea of equal protection and "one per-
son, one vote" that was the linchpin of the case deciding the 2000 election.
In Bush II, the United States Supreme Court reversed the Florida high
court's order to conduct a statewide recount of all of the State's "under-
votes. 22 Although the Court remanded the case to Florida, recounts could
not continue due to the timing constraints and the requirements prescribed
by the order.23
George W. Bush had presented the following questions to the Supreme
Court: "whether the Florida Supreme Court established new standards for
resolving Presidential election contests, thereby violating Art. II, § 1, cl. 2,
of the United States Constitution and failing to comply with 3 U.S.C. § 5,
and whether the use of standardless manual recounts violates the Equal Pro-
16. See Bush v. Gore (Bush I1), 531 U.S. 98, 111 (2000) (per curiam) (reversing the
Florida Supreme Court's recount order).
17. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 710 (Aspen
Law and Business 1997) (citing Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621, 626
(1969); Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966); Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964)).
18. 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
19. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
20. See id. at 554. See also DONALD E. LIVELY, LANDMARK SUPREME COURT CASES; A
REFERENCE GUIDE 150 (1999).
21. See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 561-62. Although this case is viewed as the point at which
the court establishes the principle, it was first announced in the preceding year in Gray v.
Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 381 (1963) ("The concept of political equality from the Declaration
of Independence to Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nine-
teenth Amendments can mean only one thing-one person, one vote.").
22. See Bush 11, 531 U.S. at 111 (per curiam). Describing the problems of so-called
"undervotes," the Court said, "[n]ationwide statistics reveal that an estimated 2% of ballots
cast do not register a vote for President for whatever reason .... This case has shown that
punch card balloting machines can produce an unfortunate number of ballots which are not
punched in a clean, complete way by the voter." Id. at 103-04.
23. See id. at 111.
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tection and Due Process Clauses."24 The Court restated the question in the
per curiam opinion: "The question before us ... is whether the recount pro-
cedures of the Florida Supreme Court has adopted are consistent with its
obligation to avoid arbitrary and disparate treatment of the members of its
electorate."25
The Court began by reviewing the Florida Supreme Court's decision to
order the recount of Florida's ballots.26 The Supreme Court explained that
the Florida court had defined a "legal vote" as "one in which there is a clear
indication of the intent of the voter."27 In explaining the equal protection
application to voting, the Court noted that the protection extends beyond the
allocation of the franchise to "the manner of its exercise."2 Further,
"[h]aving once granted the right to vote on equal terms, the State may not,
by later arbitrary and disparate treatment, value one person's vote over that
of another."29 The Court then reminded the reader that dilution of a vote's
weight effectively denies the voter the free exercise of the franchise."
Because the Florida court had ordered the intent of the voter to be dis-
cerned by a visual inspection of ballots unread by machines, the Court con-
cluded that individuals' votes had an unequal opportunity to be counted.3
Without rules on what indicated a vote for a candidate, it was the Court's
opinion that one person's vote was more or less likely to be counted depend-
ing on where and by whom it was counted.32 The Court concluded that this
constituted a violation of the principle of "one person, one vote" established
in the Court's 1963 Gray decision.33
In addition, the Court conveyed concern that the Florida Supreme
Court permitted the inclusion of partial recounts in the final certification.34
According to the per curiam opinion, including partial recounts compounds
the inequality of counting votes pursuant to the Florida court's direction.35
Without going into any further legal analysis of this concern, the Court an-
24. Id. at 103.
25. Id. at 105.
26. See id. at 100.
27. Id. at 102 (quoting Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243 (2000)).
28. Bush I1, 531 U.S. at 104.
29. Id. at 104-05 (citing Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665
(1966)).
30. See id. at 105 (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964)).
31. See id. at 106.
32. See id. at 106. The court noted that at oral arguments it was revealed that "the stan-
dards for accepting or rejecting contested ballots might vary not only from county to county
but indeed within a single county from one recount team to another." Id. (per curiam).
33. See id. at 107. Likewise, the Court noted that by the Florida order only requiring a
counting of undervotes, the so-called "overvotes" (ballots where more than one candidate
was marked) were similarly denied equal treatment. See id. at 107-08.
34. SeeBushII, 531 U.S. at 108.
35. See id. at 108.
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nounced that "[t]he press of time does not diminish the constitutional con-
cern. A desire for speed is not a general excuse for ignoring equal protection
guarantees." 6
The Court's per curiam opinion ended by describing what, if time per-
mitted, would be a constitutionally sound course for the Florida Supreme
Court to follow-essentially, practicable statewide uniform standards and
orderly judicial review.37 The Court ordered a reversal of the Florida Su-
preme Court decision to recount the undervotes and remanded the case for
further consistent proceedings.3" Since the votes needed to be counted pur-
suant to the state's laws as of 11:59 p.m. on December 12, 2000, this deci-
sion by our highest court issued at 9:54 p.m. on December 12, 2000, did not
permit the state time to manually recount the votes and retain the safe harbor
protections for its electors. With this order, the United States Supreme Court
effectively ended Florida's vote counting, and the state's decisive electors
were finally placed in the Bush column.
IV. CONSEQUENCES OF BUSH V. GORE
After the chaos of the Florida recount and the resulting court cases,
American political leaders were eager to prevent a recurrence. In early 2001,
Congress moved to reform the nation's election laws. Congress was reacting
not only to the debacle seen in Florida, but also to the shock of having the
judicial branch of our government play such a central role in affecting the
outcome of a presidential election. Despite the historical importance of one
branch of our government having such a dramatic impact on another branch,
the Court's self-limiting decision may have considerably diminished the
enduring legal significance of the case. The Bush v. Gore decision did not
explicitly compel states to devise statutes or judicial construction guarantee-
ing uniform treatment of ballots. Nor does the Court indicate that state
courts will be limited in their ability to review their states' election statutes.
The Bush v. Gore decision may very well have been an impetus for
modernization and uniformity of election procedures, but only as an indirect
result. The publicity and drama that surrounded this election and legal bat-
tles did much to encourage reform of election procedures-perhaps more so
than the Court's actual decision. Acrimony and accusations became perva-
sive as the election devolved into legal challenges. All branches of the Flor-
ida government were in unenviable positions in late 2000 as the vote counts
36. Id.
37. See id. at 110. "It would require not only the adoption (after opportunity for argu-
ment) of adequate statewide standards for determining what is a legal vote, and a practicable
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and legal fights swirled around them. We would be wise to remember the
following appearance of impropriety: the Governor of Florida was Bush's
brother; Florida's top election official was a co-chairman of Bush's State
campaign; the Florida Supreme Court Justices had all been appointed by
Democrats and continually delivered decisions that benefited Gore; and the
Republican-controlled Florida State Legislature was preparing to call a spe-
cial session to select a slate of electors for Bush. If Florida had had a clearer
record of the votes cast by its electorate, this national trauma could have
been avoided.
During the 2000 election, Florida was still using the somewhat anti-
quated so-called punch card ballots. The phrase "hanging chad" became a
sad punch line to a very troubling joke.3 9 Because many of the ballots were
not properly "punched," election officials had to make a subjective determi-
nation as to whether a voter tried to cast his or her vote for a particular can-
didate but was unable to do so. The time had come to modernize the means
for the nation's electorate to cast its vote. "In response to that election, Con-
gress passed a law in 2002 that provided billions of dollars to the states to
replace outdated voting machines."'
An obvious solution to the ongoing problems of vote counting is to
have a clear paper trail created by voters. Ideally, the voter could personally
inspect the ballot before its final submission. 41 The Help America Vote Act
(HAVA),42 passed in the wake of the 2000 election, "does not require any
particular voting system, but it sets requirements that influence what sys-
tems election officials chose." '43 One of the HAVA requirements was to
make voting more accessible to disabled persons.' To achieve this goal,
many election officials turned to so-called Direct Recording Electronic Vot-
ing Machines (DREs), commonly known as "touch screen" voting ma-
chines. 5
39. See Peter Carlson, No Hanging-Chad ClifJhanger? Oh, For the Days of '00, WASH.
POST, Nov. 4, 2004, at CI ("The whole ordeal made [it] fun to watch Letterman and Leno.");
see also Marc Peyser, Who's Next 2004: Red, White & Funny, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 29, 2003
("Any second-rate comic can mock hanging chad, the Supreme Court and a nail-biting elec-
tion--even Bill Maher seemed funny back in 2000.").
40. Zachary A. Goldfarb, Campaign Strengthens For a Voting Paper Trail, WASH. POST,
Feb. 19, 2007, at A17.
41. In this author's Arkansas voting precinct, the voters use a paper ballot and a black
ink pen on which voters mark an arrow pointing at the name of the selected candidate. The
voter then feeds his or her paper ballot into a machine that optically scans the ballot to "read"
the candidate selected. The paper ballot, which does not identify the particular voter, is then
retained for later use if a recount is needed.
42. Pub. L. No. 107-252 (2002).
43. KEVIN J. COLEMAN & ERIC A. FISCHER, CONG. RES. SERVICE REP. FOR CONGRESS,





While these DRE systems have the ability to print a paper audit of the
votes entered into the machine, they typically do not print out paper ballots
for verification by the individual voter. Because the machines directly
record the votes, there is too often no way to recount each vote cast using a
paper ballot. Rather, the election officials must rely on the integrity of the
computer system's software and the technical support from the vendors sup-
plying the system to print an audit report.
In Florida, perhaps ironically, the efforts to modernize its voting sys-
tems have led to a new controversy. Florida's United States Congressman
Robert Wexler filed suit in United States District Court arguing that Florida
is currently not in compliance with the Bush v. Gore standard and the Equal
Protection Clause of the United States Constitution because 52 counties in
Florida use optical scan machines that allow for a manual recount, while the
other 15 counties use touch-screen voting machines that have a paperless
system, which cannot be recounted in the event of a close election.46
Following Wexler's defeat at the trial court level, the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals analyzed the Congressman's claims under the Due Process
and Equal Protection clauses using the precedent of Bush v. Gore.47 The
Eleventh Circuit affirmed the trial court's ruling, concluding that strict scru-
tiny should not apply because the potential burden on voters is too remote
and slight to overcome the state's important regulatory interests. 48 In Janu-
ary 2007, the United States Supreme Court chose to avoid revisiting its frac-
tious Bush v. Gore decision with a denial of certiorari for the case.49 Of
course, this issue is much too important to fade away with just one cour-
troom defeat (or even three, in the case of Wexler v. Anderson).
On February 1, 2007, the recently elected Governor Crist of Florida, in
conjunction with Congressman Wexler, announced that his recommended
budget would include $32.5 million to establish a paper trail for all votes
46. Press Release, United States Congressman Robert Wexler (Feb. 1, 2007) available
at http://wexler.house.gov/news.php?ID=279. See also Wexler v. Anderson, 452 F.3d 1226
(11th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 934 (Jan. 08, 2007).
47. Wexler, 452 F.3d at 1231 (citing Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104-05 (2000) (per
curiam)).
48. Id. at 1232-33 ("[I]f voters in touchscreen counties are burdened at all, that burden
is the mere possibility that should they cast residual ballots, those ballots will receive a dif-
ferent, and allegedly inferior, type of review in the event of a manual recount. Such a burden,
borne of a reasonable, nondiscriminatory regulation, is not so substantial that strict scrutiny is
appropriate.") (citing Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (holding that a regulation
imposing "severe" restrictions must be "narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of com-
pelling importance"); Weber v. Shelley, 347 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2003) ("We cannot
say that use of paperless, touchscreen voting systems severely restricts the right to vote."); cf
Stewart v. Blackwell, 444 F.3d 843, 868-72 (6th Cir. 2006) (applying strict scrutiny where
plaintiffs "alleged vote dilution due to disparate use of certain voting technologies")).
49. Wexler v. Anderson, 127 S. Ct. 934 (2007).
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cast in Florida elections.5° These funds would be used to "replace touch-
screen voting machines with optical scan machines in all precincts state-
wide."51 Wexler stated, "[t]hanks to the leadership of Governor Crist, Flori-
da closes the chapter on our mismanaged elections of the past, and this state
now leads the way in election integrity-with the guarantee of a paper trail
for all votes cast.,
52
Obviously, Florida is not alone in its difficulties in counting votes.
Another lawsuit was begun recently in New Jersey in an attempt to prove (or
disprove) the reliability of the electronic voting machines used in that state.53
That suit does not specifically challenge the lack of a paper trail but rather
that the state did not properly certify that the voting machines were ade-
quately protected from tampering. 4 Counsel for the plaintiffs in the suit
claims that a Princeton University computer science professor was able to
circumvent the security measures of the machines within minutes.55 New
Jersey does have a January 2008 deadline to equip all voting machines to
enable paper printouts to check for discrepancies in the event of irregulari-
ties;5 this still does not ensure that there is an adequate paper trail, however,
for each vote cast. If, for instance, a machine were entirely disabled, defec-
tive,57 or its security became compromised, there would not be a simple
way to go back to the ballot boxes from that machine and recount those
votes.
Again today, efforts are under way in Washington to correct the prob-
lems associated with uncounted or undercounted ballots. At the time of writ-
ing this article, the United States House of Representatives has pending H.R.
811 to amend the HAVA to require a voter-verified permanent paper bal-
lot.59 The bill presently has 216 co-sponsors, including three of Arkansas's
four United States Congressmen, Marion Berry, Vic Snyder, and Mike Ross.
Considering that only 218 votes are required to pass a measure in the House,
50. Press Release, Florida Governor Charlie Crist (Feb. 1, 2007), available at
http://www.flgov.com/releases/8585.
51. Id.
52. Press Release, U.S. Congressman Robert Wexler, supra note 46.





57. Anyone who is at all familiar with personal computers can attest that today's com-
puter's operating systems are far from perfectly stable.
58. There may seem to be little incentive for a computer science expert to interfere with
the electronic voting systems, yet frequently new computer viruses are created and dissemi-
nated that have no obvious benefit to their inventors. Either through design defects or mal-
feasance, modem computers are prone to malfunctions.
59. H.R. 811, 110th Cong., § 2(a)(2)(A)(i)(2007).
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this level of co-sponsorship bodes well for the bill's passage in that body. In
addition, the United States Senate has a companion bill, S. 559, introduced
by Florida Senator Bill Nelson.6"
Both the House and the Senate bills state that "[t]he voting system shall
require the use of or produce an individual voter-verified paper ballot of the
voter's vote that shall be created by or made available for inspection and
verification by the voter before the voter's vote is cast and counted."61 In
other words, the bills would allow a voter to determine in advance if the
ballot accurately reflects his or her intention and later would allow election
officials to review those ballots to verify the vote count. This appears to be a
long-overdue protection for the fundamental rights to vote and to have one's
vote count.
V. CONCLUSION
We all deserve to have our voices heard and our votes counted. Those
two fundamental rights demand equal protection under our laws. Settling for
less than a verifiable and secure method to exercise our fundamental right to
vote seems not only shortsighted, but also foolish. The continuation of our
democracy relies on our ability to vote freely and without disruption; there-
fore, the public and our leaders must demand election systems to count
every vote.
We definitely should not make the election system any more compli-
cated than is necessary. I can think of no simpler method to ensure that all
votes are counted than the use of paper ballots that are retained until the
election is certified. Perhaps this practice seems quaint and anachronistic,
but it works. Let us hope that we never again see a need to hand count and
recount a state's ballots for president. If we do have to undertake that task,
we must act now to ensure that there are some actual ballots to count.
60. S. 599, 110th Cong. (2007).
61. Id.; see also H.R. 811, 110th Cong., § 2(a)(2)(A)(i)(2007).
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